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bstract
he rural production in Brazil has experienced a significant competitive impact with the stabilization of the economy promoted by the Real Plan in
994. Indeed, the Brazilian agriculture has achieved efficiency gains in terms of technology, economies of scale and general modernization of the
ctivity in the field. In this context, the professional management of rural production evolved. However, the governance process does not evolve
n the same dimension, and the “governance risk” is still poorly addressed in the rural environment, which often limits the potential of operations.
n this study, we sought to deepen the understanding of the factors that impact the implementation of governance practices in rural properties
n Brazil. Based on a convenience and non-probability sample, this study seeks to understand the evolution of the governance process on farms
nd its correlation with the management practices. This study found a correlation between the existence of some formal management processes
for example, strategic planning and more robust accounting systems) and advances in the governance mechanisms and processes, such as the
stablishment of a board of directors, clearer rules regarding the separation between corporate and family assets and more transparency in income
tatements. This study also found a lack of clarity in the separation of return on capital (dividend) and compensation for work (compensation
or services provided) for partners, heirs and other family members. In summary, we concluded that there is the adoption of some governance
echanisms in the rural sector, but they are still poorly developed among rural producers, hence the need to stimulate them.
 2016 Published by Elsevier Editora Ltda. on behalf of Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e
ontabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
icenses/by/4.0/).
eywords: Governance; Family firms; Rural producers
esumo
 produc¸ão rural no Brasil passou por um importante choque de competitividade a partir da estabilizac¸ão da economia promovida pelo Plano
eal em 1994. Com efeito, ganhos de eficiência foram alcanc¸ados pela agricultura brasileira, em termos de utilizac¸ão de tecnologia, economias de∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail: capfilho@usp.br (C.P. Machado Filho).
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niversidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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escala e modernizac¸ão geral da atividade no campo. Neste contexto, evoluiu a profissionalizac¸ão da gestão da atividade. No entanto, o processo
de governanc¸a não evolui na mesma dimensão com o “risco de governanc¸a” ainda pouco tratado no meio rural, o que muitas vezes limita a
potencialidade das operac¸ões. Nesta pesquisa buscou-se aprofundar o entendimento acerca de quais os fatores que impactam a implementac¸ão de
processos de “Governanc¸a” em propriedades rurais no Brasil. A partir de uma amostra por conveniência e não probabilística busca-se entender a
evoluc¸ão do processo de governanc¸a nas propriedades rurais e sua relac¸ão com práticas de gestão. Constata-se uma correlac¸ão entre a existência de
alguns processos formais de gestão (por exemplo, planejamento estratégico e sistemas de contabilidade mais robustos) e avanc¸os em mecanismos
e processos de governanc¸a, tais como o estabelecimento de conselho de administrac¸ão, regras claras de separac¸ão entre ativos da família e da
empresa e maior transparência nas demonstrac¸ões financeiras. Nota-se, ainda, pouca clareza na separac¸ão do que vem a ser a remunerac¸ão do
capital (dividendo) e do trabalho (pró labore), por parte de sócios, herdeiros e outros membros familiares. Em síntese, conclui-se que existe a
adoc¸ão de alguns mecanismos de governanc¸a no meio rural, mas que esses ainda são poucos desenvolvidos entre os produtores agrícolas, sendo
necessário o seu incentivo.
© 2016 Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. em nome de Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e
Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).
Palavras-chave: Governanc¸a; Empresas Familiares; Produtores Rurais
Resumen
La producción rural en Brasil ha experimentado un impacto competitivo significativo desde la estabilización de la economía impulsada por el
Plan Real de 1994. Efectivamente, la agricultura brasilen˜a ha logrado una mayor eficiencia con relación al uso de tecnología, economías de
escala y modernización general de las actividades en el campo. En este contexto, se ha desarrollado la gestión profesional de la actividad. Sin
embargo, el proceso de gobernanza no se ha desarrollado en consonancia con el “riesgo de gobernanza”, dimensión todavía poco tratada en el
medio rural, lo que a menudo limita el potencial de las operaciones. En este estudio se intenta profundizar la comprensión de los factores que
influyen en la implementación de procesos de “gobernanza” en propiedades rurales en Brasil. A partir de una muestra por conveniencia y no
probabilística se analiza la evolución del proceso de gobernanza en propiedades rurales y su relación con las prácticas de gestión. Se ha encontrado
una correlación entre la existencia de algunos procesos formales de gestión (como, por ejemplo, la planificación estratégica y los sistemas más
robustos de contabilidad) y los avances en mecanismos y procesos de gobernanza, tales como la creación de un consejo administrativo, reglas
claras de separación entre los activos de la familia y los de la empresa, y una mayor transparencia en las demostraciones financieras. Se nota,
además, poca precisión en la distinción de lo que constituye la remuneración del capital (dividendos) y la remuneración del trabajo, por parte de
los socios, herederos y otros miembros de la familia. En resumen, se concluye que existe la adopción de algunos mecanismos de gobernanza en el
medio rural, no obstante, dichos mecanismos no están suficientemente desarrollados entre los agricultores, por eso la necesidad de su incentivo.
© 2016 Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. en nombre de Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e
Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP. Este es un artı´culo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).
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ntroduction
The agribusiness sector in Brazil represents approximately
2.5% of Brazil’s GDP – based on data of 2013, generating
pproximately US$ 81 billion of trade surplus in 2014 (ABAG,
015). Its supply chains are formed by a wide variety of organiza-
ions, from large multinational corporations in the agrochemical,
ood processing and distribution, energy and fiber industries, to
ompanies related to rural production, formed by cooperative
rganizations and family businesses of different sizes.
The term agribusiness was introduced in the literature by
arvard University professors John Davis and Ray Goldberg, in
957. The broad definition of the term implies a systemic view
hat expands the dimension of rural production itself (Davis &
oldberg, 1957):
A commodity system encompasses all the participants
involved in production, processing and marketing of a
product. This system includes the market of agricultural sup-
plies, agricultural production, storage operations, processing,
wholesale and retail, delimiting a flow that ranges from
inputs to the final consumer. The concept encompasses all the
institutions which affect the coordination of the successive
h
t
i
tstages of a commodity flow, such as the government, futures
markets and trade associations (Davis and Goldberg, 1957,
p. 2).
Zylbersztajn (2000) developed the concept of agro-industrial
ystems (AGS) as the unit of analysis based on products of rural
rigin. This analytical model highlights the transactions between
he economic agents – industry of agricultural inputs, agricul-
ural and livestock production; manufacturing and processing
ndustry, distribution (wholesale and retail) and consumers –
ermeated by the institutional environment (laws, rules, regu-
ations) and the organizational environment (support agencies,
esearch, banks, professional organizations, etc.).
In the jargon of agribusiness agents, the systemic delimitation
onsiders the following segments: (1) “farm supplies”, which
upplies farm inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, seeds), machinery
nd equipment used in rural activities; (2) “farm production”,
epresenting the rural production activities in the field, which
ake up the products of agricultural origin, forestry and animal
usbandry; (3) “processing and distribution”, which represents
he food, fiber and energy processing/industrialization activities,
n addition to the distribution segments (wholesale and retail),
o the final consumer (Tejon & Xavier, 2009).
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The focus of this study is the “farm  production” sector,
ddressing the rural production activities. Rural production,
pecifically, has experienced a significant competitive impact
ith the stabilization of the economy promoted by the Real Plan
n 1994 (Machado Filho, 2009). Indeed, the Brazilian agriculture
chieved efficiency gains in terms of technology, economies of
cale and overall modernization of the activity in the field. The
volution of the production of grains and planted area illustrates
he evolution of the sector: Based on data released by Conab
2015), between 1990 and 2015, grain production in Brazil
ncreased from approximately 58 million tons to 206.34 million
ons (estimates of 2014/15 crop), that is, it increased 255.75%
n this 26-year period, accounting for an average annual pro-
uction growth of 4.64%. In the same period, the planted area
ncreased from approximately 39 million hectares to an esti-
ated 57.52 million hectares in the 2014/15 crop, that is, it
ncreased only 47.48%, indicating an average annual growth in
lanted area of 1.50%. Therefore, it can be seen that it repre-
ented a huge yield gain in land use in the period surveyed, from
.49 tons of grain per hectare in 1990 to 3.59 tons in 2015, that
s, an increase of 140.93%, with an average yield of 3.44% per
ear.
In this context, the professionalization of management has
volved, with increasingly professional structures ahead of the
arms, whose nature of activity requires skills in terms of pro-
uction, sales and finance. Essentially, it involves the adoption
f more rational management practices rather than intuitive and
ersonalist methods (Lodi, 1993). The management of market
isks and production inherent in the agricultural activity, is one
f the key success factors of the activity in the field. As a result,
he process of professionalization of management involves the
mplementation of formal processes of strategic planning and
udgeting, cost control tools, management information systems,
mong others.
However, the governance process does not evolve as the
ncreasing professionalization process of the agricultural activ-
ty requires. The “governance risk” is still poorly addressed in
he rural environment, which often limits the potential of opera-
ions. The governance problem explored in this study addresses
he alignment of interests between various stakeholders in the
amily organization. As the generations succeed one another in
he division of assets and in the control of the rural property,
onflicts of interest are enhanced. Divergences in relation to
he vision of the future of the business, expectations regarding
he allocation of profits, expansion of investments, exposure to
ebt, appointment of family members to management positions,
mong others, indicate the potential for conflicts (Alcântara &
achado Filho, 2014). This study starts with the premise that
he mitigation of these risk factors is associated with the imple-
entation of governance processes, involving the structuring of
re-defined decision-making bodies, levels of authority, rules
nd agreements in the management and ownership of the busi-
ess.Based on the foregoing, the purpose of this study is to under-
tand which factors impact the formalization of governance
rocesses in rural properties in Brazil. This study seeks to ana-
yze the rural activity, also referred to as commercial agriculture.
v
b
v
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The relevance of the research problem presented consists of
nderstanding the restrictive factors for the adoption of gover-
ance practices in the rural firm and their relationship with the
anagement practices of the firm, once they are essential for
he consolidation of the professionalization of agribusiness in
he rural property.
Based on that, the overall purpose of this research is to ana-
yze the relationship between the governance and management
ractices adopted in rural properties, specifically seeking to:
(a) Evaluate the relationship between the adoption of formal
planning and decision-making processes and the existence
of the board of directors.
b) Analyze the existence of members’ agreements in rural
properties.
(c) Examine the legal nature of rural properties (individual and
corporate).
d) Check the existence of board of directors in rural properties.
(e) Check the existence of compensation for management ser-
vices and the profit sharing mechanism in rural properties.
(f) Study the relationship between the age of managers and the
adoption of financial control tools in rural properties.
g) Find out the types of financial control and accounting prac-
tices adopted in rural properties.
heoretical  reflections
The theoretical framework proposed in this research involves
he subject of “Governance” within the context of firms con-
rolled by families. An overall review on the subject of
overnance will be presented and we will particularly address
he family firms. We will also consider the specificities of rural
roperties.
he  evolution  of governance
In any situation where the decision-making power is trans-
erred or shared, an information asymmetry arises to a greater
r lesser extent. Whether in a private or public company, club,
ssociations, cooperatives, universities, there will always be a
reater or lesser degree of conflict of interest, resulting from
he delegation of some kind of power. In other words, “some-
ne” governs on behalf of “someone” who has delegated rights
o exercise the power. Minimizing asymmetries and conflicts
f interest inherent in the delegation of power is the central
hallenge of governance practices in any organization (Becht,
olton, & Roell, 2012).
From the seminal studies of Spence and Zeckhauser (1971)
nd Ross (1974), the researchers of the science of organizations
egan to pay attention to the Agency theory, later developed
y Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983).
he agency problem is an essential element in the contractual
ision of the firm, brought by Coase (1937). The relationship
etween principal-agent is always confrontational when an indi-
idual (agent) acts on behalf of another (principal) and their
bjectives do not fully coincide. In essence, governance deals
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ith the minimization of asymmetries and conflicts of interest
nherent in the delegation of power (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
The issue regarding the separation between ownership and
ontrol in modern organizations was highlighted in a clas-
ic study conducted by the authors Berle and Mean (1932),
nalyzing the growth of US companies in the 20s, with the
issemination of the capital of organizations and the dispersed
ontrol. This study holds a prominent position in the develop-
ent of organizational theory, which was later deepened with
he development of the agency theory, which deals with conflicts
f separation of ownership and control (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985;
ensen & Meckling, 1976).
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), a greater align-
ent in agency relationships occurs when certain premises are
chieved:
 agents have no hidden information (absence of information
asymmetry), thus the principal is aware of what constitutes
an efficient action and the expected product;
 the principal has complete information with regard to the
actions and results;
 agents act at low risk (they are aware of what they will receive
with their conduct in line with the interest of the principal).
Organizations create governance mechanisms to deal with
he delegation of power (Machado Filho, 2006). In a simplified
anner, the genesis of an organization that is established and
rows in the market involves a few steps: The “owner” estab-
ishes the company – the company grows – the owner no longer
perates alone, the company goes through successive processes
f delegation. The “owner” is forced to implement incentive
nd monitoring mechanisms so that the agents, to whom the
wner delegated powers, are aligned with its expectations. In
nother step, new generations succeed the control of the orga-
ization, and the new owners start sharing the decision-making
ower.
he  challenges  of  governance  in  family-controlled
rganizations
Over the generations that succeed in the control of an
rganization, the dispersion of capital is intrinsic, unless the
rganization perishes. The governance problem becomes more
omplex as the dispersion of capital occurs, which is a typical
roblem of collective action among investors for equating the
ecision rights and the rights on profits generated by the enter-
rise (Machado Filho, 2006). That is, as the generations succeed
ne another, new family members (siblings, cousins, relatives)
tart sharing the power. Over the generations, the new members
inherit” not only the equity interest in the business, but also
inherit” the members of the company.” Usually with visions
ompletely different in relation to how to manage the busi-
ess, predisposition to assume risks, distribution of dividends,
einvestments, level of indebtedness, etc.
In summary, “governance” has to do with the delegation of
ower: how  power  is  shared  and  how  the  interests  can  be  aligned.
n family firms, in which the members may play the role of
i
fi
f
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wners and managers (principal and agent), the amplification
f the governance problem occurs as the power of the owners
s disseminated among the members of different generations in
he family business.
Definitions for family business are presented in the litera-
ure and are based on both tangible and intangible criteria to
etermine it. In this paper, we adopt the following definition for
amily business: an organization in which the effective control
f the business (whether by owning the majority of capital or by
embers’ agreements) is under the power of the family (as quo-
as, shares or as individuals, as it is most common in properties
ural) (Alcântara & Machado Filho, 2014).
The theoretical approach to deal with family firms involves
egal, financial, economic, tax and behavioral aspects. Sharma
2004) emphasizes that the literature addresses four levels of
nalysis in family firms: individual, interpersonal, organiza-
ional and social. At the individual level, the studies highlight
our categories of internal stakeholders: founders, heirs, women
nd non-family employees. The theoretical background of
hese dimensions, derived from psychological and sociologi-
al theories, approach characteristics of the different profiles of
takeholders, with emphasis on the categories of founders and
eirs. The “emotional capital” of individuals in family firms
ccounts for a significant portion of success or failure of the
amily business over the generations.
Exploratory studies point out the variables “commitment to
he business” and “integrity” as the most desired attributes of the
ounders in relation to the characteristics of the heirs (Chrisman,
hua, & Sharma, 1998). Other attributes mentioned by the same
uthors are: (i) the ability to gain respect of non-family members
f the company; (ii) skills in decision-making; (iii) interpersonal
kills; (iv) experience; (v) intelligence and (vi) confidence.
At the interpersonal level, the nature and type of contrac-
ual arrangements are the focus of analysis of the agency theory
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On the one hand, the alignment
etween owners and managers would be less costly, due to the
resence of the relationship of “trust” and altruism among fam-
ly members. On the other hand, studies report the predominant
otivation of self-interest between family members (Shleifer &
ishny, 1997).
An alternative approach is offered by Stewardship Theory
Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). This theory is based on
umanist and benign assumptions of human nature, in contrast to
he self-interested and opportunistic view of the agency theory.
teier (2001) proposes the existence of a continuum, whereas
ltruism and opportunism act as opposite poles. In this sense,
he implementation of governance mechanisms is suggested to
itigate the negative effects that may arise in the relationships
ithin the family group, especially as the generations succeed
ne another, with the natural affective and cultural distancing.
The models of analysis of the relationships between the dif-
erent variables present in family firms are still pre-paradigmatic,
eflecting the incipient stage of development of a robust theoret-
cal framework. Some basic questions are imposed: Are family
rms really different from other organizational models? Why do
amily firms deserve special attention from a specific research
eld? (Sharma, 2004).
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As other organizations, family firms are dynamic entities.
s they evolve over time, they experience successive stages
f development. The first conceptual model proposed for the
tudy of family firms emerged in the 60s and addressed two
imensions to help the understanding of the operation of fam-
ly firms, family and business. Later, in the 90s, Gersick, Davis,
ampton and Lansberg (1997) proposed a new model based on
hree dimensions: (i) management; (ii) property and (iii) family.
his model considers the time dimension through the represen-
ation of these dimensions in development axes in which there
s a sequence of stages to be followed over the development of
he family business.
In addition to these challenges, an issue also addressed in the
amily business is related to agency problems and their coordina-
ion costs in the relationship between agent – principal, which in
his case is when the manager, who is part of the family, can act in
elf-interest, even if it implies loss to the other owners members
f the same family (Alcântara & Machado Filho, 2014; Chua,
hrisman, & Sharma, 2003; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006).
In family firms, an aspect that stands out is in relation to
he trust existing between the agents. This trust can be used
s a governance mechanism. Trust fulfills the need of more for-
al contractual arrangements. However, as transactions become
ecurrent among the agents, there is an erosion of that trust, giv-
ng rise to opportunistic behaviors. When generations succeed
ne another, individuals distance themselves from their com-
on origin and the cooperation among the agents, previously
timulated by the close interaction, may be weakened in this pro-
ess (Steier, 2001). It is suggested, therefore, that the challenges
nherent in agency problems are crucial to the establishment of
overnance mechanisms over the generations that follow.
ural  property:  organizational  and  institutional  specificities
Traditionally, in Brazil, due to the legal institutional environ-
ent, rural properties (farms) are “individual entities”, although,
ith the amendment of the Brazilian Civil Code in 2002, there
s already higher flexibility to convert individual entity into
egal entity. However, a series of cultural aspects, especially tax
spects, still condition the predominance of individual entity in
he rural activity. This is an important risk factor for the longevity
f the activities. “Splitting the production unit” among heirs is
ery common, which often implies loss of scale and efficiency
n the production (Machado Filho, 2009).
As the rural company evolves over time, the perspective of
ontinuity of the business reduces over the generations of the
ame family. Data released by the 2006 Agricultural and Live-
tock Census (Censo Agropecuário 2006) (IBGE, 2010) indicate
hat, in terms of longevity, 57% of the Brazilian rural companies
ave less than 10 years of existence, 23% between 10 and 21
ears, 13% between 20 and 31 years, 5% between 30 and 41
ears and only 2% of the rural companies have more than 41
ears of existence.In a study conducted by Alcântara and Machado Filho (2014)
ith a group of farmers, it was found that, in part, the motivations
or the continuation of the rural enterprise by the heirs combine:
i) the affective relationship between the family members and
2
a
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he family business; (ii) the fact that the assets of this company
onstitute a capital reserve for the family; (iii) a professional
lternative for the family, and (iv) a business opportunity. Among
he challenges identified, the study highlighted the implications
f the dispersion of the property for the adoption of growth
trategies and the motivation of the younger generation to con-
inue the family business. In addition, it points out governance
tructures that emerge in the development of the rural company.
t highlights the transition from an informal structure based on
rust to more formal governance structures, such as shareholders’
eetings and boards of directors.
The board of directors stands out among the formal gov-
rnance mechanisms and practices in family organizations.
raditionally, the board of directors is responsible for the moni-
oring, control, strategic guidance and institutional support to the
rganizations (Bailey and Peck, 2013; Becht et al., 2012; Ees,
abrielsson, & Huse, 2009; Guerra, Fischmann, & Machado
ilho, 2009; Tirole, 2006). In family organizations, an additional
ole can be incorporated into the duties of the board of direc-
ors: the search for balance between the rational and emotional
imensions involved in the decision-making process (Alcântara
 Machado Filho, 2014; Bailey and Peck, 2013; Bammens,
oordeckers, & Van Gils, 2011). In this sense, it can be said
hat the adoption of the decision-making body, represented by
he board of directors, represents an evolution in the process of
rofessionalization in family firms.
In addition, an instrument used in the search for balance
n corporate relations is the members’ agreement. Ideally, the
greement is a contractual mechanism to manage tensions
etween members and the organization (León, 2006). Espe-
ially in a family organization, in which the successors have
ot “chosen each other as members,” it can be suggested that
he members’ agreement is an important stabilization element
n the relations between family members.
As the premise of this study, we consider that the implemen-
ation of the board of directors and the adoption of corporate
greements are inserted in the evolutionary process of gover-
ance practices and professionalization of family organizations.
ethodology
This study is based on the analysis of the perception of
espondents in relation to the governance practices adopted.
his research is exploratory, with applications of quantitative
esearch techniques, involving a survey of secondary and pri-
ary data. Secondary data were collected from the bibliographic
nd documentary research and sought to provide the theoretical
asis to address the research problem, as well as identify vari-
bles of analysis to integrate the questionnaire that was applied to
 sample of farmers from Mato Grosso do Sul and Mato Grosso.
his is a convenience and non-probability sample, since it has
o randomness in its composition and we do not intend to make
tatistical inferences based on the results (Marconi & Lakatos,
011).
The collection of primary data was performed through the
pplication of semi-structured questionnaires (Malhotra, 2001)
ith families managing rural companies participating in the
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Table 1
Profile of rural enterprise and entrepreneur.
Activities developed Tradition in the rural activity
Qty % Qty %
Grains 26 74% 1st generation 5 14%
Cotton 3 9% 2nd generation 11 31%
Cattle raising 26 74% 3rd generation 7 20%
Tourism 0 0% >3rd generation 12 34%
Others 4 11% Total 35 100%
Grains and cattle raising 17 49%
Time in the rural activity Average turnover (R$)
Qty % Qty %
Up to 25 years 9 26% Up to R$500,000/year 3 9%
From 25 to 50 years 23 68% R$500,000 to R$1 million/year 1 3%
>50 years 2 6% R$1 to R$5 million/year 15 44%
Total 34 100% >R$5,000,000/year 15 44%
Total 34 100%
Respondent’s age Parents’ education
Qty %
Up to 25 years 0 0% Elementary and middle school 7 21%
From 25 to 50 years 5 15% High school 8 24%
>50 years 28 85% Undergraduate school 12 35%
Total 33 100% Graduate school 7 21%
Total 34 100%
Children’s education
Elementary and middle school 0 0%
High school 1 3%
Undergraduate school 13 45%
Graduate school 15 52%
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ource: Research Data.
Training program for owners and heirs of agribusiness compa-
ies: Transforming heirs into partners.” This training program
as offered by the National Rural Education Service (SENAR)
f Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) and Mato Grosso (MT), which
onfers the convenience nature to the sample.
There were four (4) classes in Mato Grosso do Sul and one
1) in Mato Grosso. The program aimed at the development
f heirs, partners and managers to deal with the challenges of
he longevity of family-controlled companies, with emphasis
n governance and succession processes in the rural proper-
ies, structured into sixty four (64) hours, distributed in six (6)
odules: (i) business family – challenges of succession; (ii)
overnance of the family business: challenges of the corporate
tructure and business management; (iii) challenges of financial
anagement in family firms; (iv) strategy in family firms; (v)
orporate law in rural family firms, and (vi) tax and accounting
anagement: challenges of rural family business.
Each questionnaire was answered by only one person from
ach family group, and who has a leadership profile in the
roup. Therefore, out of a total of 120 participants, our final
ample included 35 valid questionnaires, which is higher than
he amount required, which is 30 respondents, and sufficient
or a quantitative analysis of the data collected according to
D
I29 100%
he central limit theorem (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black,
008; Malhotra, 2001). The questionnaire was structured in four
4) topics: (i) profile of rural enterprise and entrepreneur; (ii)
overnance; (iii) management processes; and (iv) strategy and
overnance.
The data analysis was performed in two steps: (i) descrip-
ive analysis and (ii) multivariate analysis (chi-square test and
ultiple correspondence analysis of significant variables). For
he descriptive analysis, we assessed the frequency of answers,
hich is shown in percentages. The multivariate analysis seeks
o identify clusters that characterize the set of producers inter-
iewed. For that, a set of hypotheses was initially identified,
hose relationship of dependence among the proposed variables
as observed by applying a Chi-square test. The hypotheses
nd their evaluation (rejected or not) are shown in Table 1.
ubsequently, a multiple correspondence analysis of signifi-
ant variables was made seeking to identify clusters among the
roducers interviewed (Hair et al., 2008).ata  analysis  and  presentation
The research data are presented and analyzed in two steps.
n the first step, we make a description of the results based on
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Table 2
Governance.
Importance of the subject “Governance” Members’ agreement?
Qty % Qty %
Extremely important 27 79% Yes 5 14%
Important 6 18% No 30 86%
Relatively important 1 3% Total 35 100%
Less important 0 0%
Irrelevant 0 0%
Total 34 100%
Intention to enter into a members’ agreement? Is the family members’ role clear?
Qty % Qty %
Yes 17 59% Yes 19 56%
No 2 7% No 15 44%
Maybe 10 34% Total 34 100%
Total 29 100%
Separation of accounts? Compensation for services provided?
Qty % Qty %
Yes 23 66% Yes 23 68%
No 12 34% No 11 32%
Total 35 100% Total 34 100%
Profit sharing? Board of directors?
Qty % Qty %
Yes 13 37% Yes 6 17%
No 22 63% No 29 83%
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ource: Research Data.
he frequency of answers. In the second step, we try to create
ypologies of rural entrepreneurs considering the adoption of
overnance practices and the profile of the respondents.
escription  of  results
The description of results is developed based on four main
opics: (i) profile of rural enterprise and entrepreneur; (ii) gov-
rnance; (iii) management; and (iv) strategy and governance.
Based on Table 1, we have the characterization of the rural
ntrepreneur. It was found that 49% of respondents develop joint
griculture and livestock activities, are producers with tradition
n rural activity (54% above 2nd generation), and out of the total
4% have more than 25 years of activity in the sector. Most
espondents (85%) are aged 50+ and in relation to their parents’
ducation level, 35% informed that they attended higher edu-
ation and 45% attended middle school and high school. The
ducation level of their children is mostly (97%) undergrad-
ates/graduates, and 52% of respondents answered that their
hildren are graduates. The average turnover of enterprises is
bove R$ 1 million (88%), and 44% above R$ 5 million.Table 2 shows a summary of data relating to questions
bout governance. Note that 79% deems the governance issue
xtremely important. In addition, 86% reported that they do not
ave a members’ agreement.
m
t
w
qTotal 35 100%
The relevance of the subject and the intention to advance in
his new frontier of management of rural companies are con-
rmed when 59% intends to enter into a members’ agreement.
n general, for 56% of the producers, the role of family mem-
ers in the governance process of the rural business is clear, and
3% reported that there is no advisory board that supports the
anagement/governance of the rural enterprise. Regarding the
eparation between the managers’ corporate bank accounts and
ersonal bank accounts, 66% answered that there is no separa-
ion between them. Out of the total respondents, 68% answered
hat their compensation is based on their services provided, and
3% reports that there is no profit sharing in the end of the
ompany’s fiscal year. Part of respondents believes that profit
haring is not a common practice and that if they have profits,
hey should be reinvested in the company.
Based on Table 3, it can be seen that the vast majority of
usinesses is not a corporate legal entity, and 89% is structured
s an individual entity (IE). Almost half of respondents (47%)
nswered that they have tax accounting only, which is performed
y a specialized firm (65%). In terms of management control,
4% answered that they calculate production costs, 71% prepare
ash flows and 37% have balance sheets (BS) and income state-
ents for the fiscal year (ISFY). Therefore, this study verifies
he incipient economic and financial management of enterprises,
ith low adherence to traditional tools and practices for an ade-
uate corporate management, despite the complexity of the rural
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Table 3
Management of enterprises.
Legal nature How is the accounting done?
Qty % Qty %
Individual entity (IE) 31 89% No accounting 1 3%
Legal entity (LE) 2 6% Tax accounting only 16 47%
IE and LE 2 6% Management and tax accounting 17 50%
Total 35 100% Total 34 100%
Where is the accounting done? What are the existing formal controls?
Qty % Qty %
Specialized firm 22 65% Production costs 26 74%
At the company, with an employed accountant. 2 6% Cash flows 25 71%
At the company, with an outsourced accountant. 10 29% Balance sheet and income statement 13 37%
Total 34 100% No formal controls 5 14%
Separation between treasury and controllership?
Qty %
Yes 3 9%
No 31 91%
T
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Sotal 34 
ource: Research Data.
usiness and the large volume of funds transacted. Addition-
lly, 91% of the respondents answered that they do not separate
reasury activities from controllership activities.
In general, 74% of the respondents answered that they do
ot have a structured strategic planning, and that the decision-
aking process is under the responsibility of the managing
embers (62%). However, the large majority (94%) considers
trategic planning extremely important/important to the gover-
ance of the enterprise. Given the absence of an advisory board
or 80% of the respondents (Table 4), the approval of strate-
ic decisions by an advisory board is made by only 20% of the
espondents. As in the economic and financial management, it
s understood that, also for strategic management, entrepreneurs
a
4
m
able 4
trategy and governance.
tructured strategic planning? Who pa
Qty % 
es 9 26% Manag
o 25 74% Manag
otal 34 100% Manag
Manag
Total 
re the decisions approved by the board? Importa
Qty % 
es 6 20% Extrem
o, because there is no Board 24 80% Importa
o, despite the existence of a Board 0 0% Relativ
otal 30 100% Less im
Irreleva
Total 
ource: Research Data.100%
ave challenges to overcome in order to achieve good gover-
ance practices.
ypologies  of  producers:  governance
ypothesis  testing
In order to test the hypotheses proposed in Table 5, two types
f analysis and/or tests were made: (i) a Chi-square test fornd (ii) an average comparison test (t  test) with the hypothesis
 (H4), as it contains a continuous variable (the age of the main
anager of the enterprise) (Hair et al., 2008).
rticipates in the decision-making process?
Qty %
ing members 21 62%
ing and non-managing members 7 21%
ing members and selected employees 4 12%
ing and non-managing members and employees 2 6%
34 100%
nce of strategic planning
Qty %
ely important 14 41%
nt 18 53%
ely important 1 3%
portant 1 3%
nt 0 0%
34 100%
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Table 5
Summary of the hypotheses testes and results.
Hypothesis Description Status
H1 There is a relationship between the organization having an advisory board and its strategic decisions being
approved by this board, thus showing a better organization of the rural company and a more structured and better
refined strategic decision-making process.
Not rejected***
H2 There is a relationship between the practice of profit-sharing among the members and this sharing for all family
members, as this profit results from a family firm, which is an asset of all family members and not only of its
managers belonging to the family.
Not rejected***
H3 The higher the number of business units the rural company has the higher the probability of its accounting being
done externally, as the volume of financial and management information to be collected and interpreted is higher
and more complex.
Not rejected**
H4 The younger the main manager of the enterprise (decision maker) the higher the probability of having production
cost control, as this manager may have more access to modern cost and cost management techniques.
Not rejected**
H5 The higher the company’s income, the greater the likelihood of this rural company to use balance sheets and
income statements, as this shows a larger accounting and management organization, which is necessary and
expected in a larger rural enterprise
* Significance at 10% level.
** Significance at 5% level.
*** Significance at 1% level.
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As it can be seen in Table 5, the five hypotheses proposed
ere not rejected, and two of these hypotheses (H3 and H4)
ere not rejected with a level of significance of 5% and three of
hese hypotheses (H1, H2 and H5) had their no rejection at the
evel of 1%.
ultiple  correspondence  analysis
For didactic purposes and for a better understanding of these
elationships, examined and analyzed in the hypotheses above,
e developed a multiple correspondence analysis in the vari-
bles analyzed in the first two hypotheses (H1 and H2) (Fig. 1)
nd also in the variables of two other hypotheses (H3 and H5)
Fig. 2). For being the only hypothesis proposed here and tested
ontaining a continuous variable, hypothesis 4 (H4) was ana-
yzed through the normal distribution of its data (age of the mainanager of the enterprise) compared to the fact of whether or
ot the management control of production costs is used (Fig. 3)
Hair et al., 2008).
m
p
oypotheses proposed and tested in this research (H3 and H5).
ource: Research data.
In Fig. 1, it can be seen that the clusters/groups can be identi-
ed with these variables in two dimensions. The first dimension,
ith the explanatory power of 76.70% of variance of these
uestions, was named as planning  informality, mainly due to
he fact that all options of non-adoption of the practices stud-
ed here Strategic Planning {SP (No)}; advisory board {CO
Não)}; strategic decision approved by Board {SDAB (No)};
nd profit sharing {PS(No)}  are located on the positive side of
his scale, thus indicating that the greater this scale is the greater
he strategic informality presented in these rural enterprises.
The second dimension, with an explanatory power of 4.60%
f variance of the questions, corresponds to profit  sharing  infor-
ality as the main factor to categorize this dimension was
who are the beneficiaries of the profit sharing,” whether “only
he managing members of the enterprise” Profit sharing {PS
ManPartn)}, negative value on this scale – as it shows greater
anagerial formality and motivation to these managers for the
rofit sharing obtained in this rural company – or a positive value
n this scale – as it will award all members belonging to the
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broader context in rural organizations. On the one hand, theost control (H4).
ource: Research data.
amily, the company {Profit sharing (PS) [FamPartn]}, regard-
ess of the fact that this member is or is not part of the company’s
anagement – demonstrating greater managerial informality in
he distribution of the financial surplus obtained.
Based on these variables, it is possible to identify a few
lusters:
(a) There is a relationship between the non-adoption of gov-
ernance practices and management processes (dashed and
dotted circle {-.-.-}far right of Fig. 1)].
b) There is a relationship between the adoption of “strategic
planning practices {SP (Yes)}”, the decision to implement
profit sharing {PS (Yes)}  and this profit sharing benefit all
family members {PS (FamPartn) (dotted circle {...}, in the
middle of Fig. 1).
(c) There is a close relationship between the existence of advi-
sory board {AB (Yes)}  and strategic decisions approved by
the Board {SDAB (Yes)}  (dashed circle {—}, far left of
Fig. 1).
d) It can be seen that despite not being inserted in any circle
of proximity, the option “profit sharing only among man-
aging partners” {PS(ManPartn)}  has a greater proximity to
the dashed circle (—), that is, with the options relating to
the existence of advisory board {AB (Yes)}  and strategic
decisions approved by the board {SDAB (Yes)}.
In Fig. 2, it can be seen that the clusters/groups can be identi-
ed with these variables in two dimensions under analysis. The
rst dimension, with explanatory power of 67.70% of variance
f these questions, was named as reduced  size  of  the  enter-
rise, mainly due to the fact that, according to the statistical
nalyzes, the variables that most contributed to the creation of
his dimension were: (a) the number of production units (PU);
b) the company’s revenues (R$). Note that the smaller the size
f the rural enterprise under analysis the higher the values in this
cale, as it can be seen in the case of a company with only one
roduction unit (1 PU) and with turnover up to R$ 500,000 per
a
t
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ear (≤500m) in a positive end of this scale and on the negative
nd, those with more than five (5) production units (>5 PU) and
 turnover exceeding R$5 million per year (>5M).
The second dimension, with explanatory power of 12.70% of
ariances of the questions, corresponds to the formality  of  draft-
ng the  accounting  of  the  rural  enterprise. The main factor that
ssisted in this categorization, through statistical analysis, was
he place where the accounting of the rural enterprises was held.
his dimension can be represented by its extremes: (a) upper end
 accounting office (AO), positive values; accounting conducted
n the rural company (ARC) value virtually zero on this scale;
b) lower end – accounting conducted with support from an out-
ourced accounting firm, here represented by negative values
AOS).
Based on these variables, it is possible to identify a few
lusters:
a) There is a relationship between the “Non-adoption of bal-
ance sheet and income statements” {BS IS (No)}, “size of
the rural company between 03 and 05 production units” (3-5
PU) and “accounting conducted at an accounting firm” (AF)
(dashed and dotted circle {–.–.), in the upper side of Fig. 2.
b) There is a greater relationship (greater proximity to its
points) between “use of balance sheet and income state-
ment” {BP DRE(S)}  and “larger rural enterprises” {with
more than 5 production units (>5UN) and with revenues
greater than R$ 5 million (>5M)}  (dashed circle {----}, far
left of Fig. 2).
c) There is a relationship between “the accounting of the rural
enterprise is conducted, but with the support of an account-
ing firm” (AF), and rural properties with turnover between
R$ 500,000 and R$ 1 million (500m–1M). Companies with
turnover between R$ 1 million and R$ 5 million (1M–5M)
and companies between 01 and 03 production units (1–3
PU), that is, considered as “middle sized” do not hire an
accountant to do the company’s accounting (AC) (next to
the dashed circle) and also do not hire the services of an
accounting firm (AF) (dashed and dotted circle {.-.-}). That
is, middle-sized companies tend to do the accounting at
the farm’s office with the assistance of an accounting firm
(ContTerceiri) {only dotted circle (...)}.
Fig. 3 shows that, besides the fact that the average age among
hose who adopt the management control of production costs
nd those who do not are different (as already attested by the
on-rejection of hypothesis H4), there is an asymmetry in the dis-
ribution of the percentage of frequency of respondents who do
ot perform this management control, especially concentrating
n the older age groups.
inal  considerations
The governance process should be understood within adoption of governance mechanisms involving the adequacy to
he principles of transparency and compliance has been increas-
ngly required by the own forces of the market. Investors,
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reditors and business partners have increased their requirements
or rural properties to advance in governance processes as a crit-
cal factor for the sustainability of the rural activity in the long
erm.
On the other hand, the adoption of governance mechanisms
hat regulate the relations of power and the alignment of interests
s still poorly developed in the rural producers’ environment.
his governance risk becomes more severe as family generations
ucceed in the control of the property and share power.
As seen in this study, there is a correlation between the exist-
nce of some formal management processes (such as more robust
trategic planning and accounting systems) and advances in
he governance mechanisms and processes, such as the estab-
ishment of a board of directors, clearer rules of separation of
orporate and family assets and more transparency in financial
tatements. There is also little transparency with regard to the
eparation of what is return on capital (dividend) and compensa-
ion for work (compensation for services provided) for members,
eirs and other family members.
Therefore, it can be seen that this study empirically con-
ributed to demonstrate, through the models and analysis
roposed and performed herein, that there may be various rela-
ionships among the most different business decisions, from
hose that were often perceived as independent, such as the
evelopment of strategic planning {SP (Yes)}, the decision to
erform profit sharing {PS (Yes)}  and the profit sharing bene-
ts all family members {PS (FamPartn)}; to the confirmation
f dependence on some relationship previously expected by the
iterature review, such as the strategic decisions approved by a
oard {SDAB (Yes)}  and having an advisory board (AB), both
onnections exposed in more detail in Fig. 1.
Likewise, it can be seen that the relationships of dependence
nd independence between the company size and accounting for-
ality were empirically demonstrated (Fig. 2), from the most
xpected, according to the literature, such as the connection
etween the companies with more than 05 -production units
>5PU), companies with turnover exceeding R$5 million (>5M)
nd the lack of use of balance sheet (BS) and income statements
BS IS(No)}.
Finally, we believe that this research has contributed to future
tudies in this research field by observing that all five hypotheses
roposed here (H1–H5) were not rejected, which may guide new
nquiries and/or questions for future studies on topics related to
he one presented in this paper.
It is also noted that, although the research sample was inten-
ional, consisting of participants of the training programs of
ENAR MS and SENAR MT, presuming that they already
ad some predisposition to address the topics related to “Gov-
rnance,” the fact that 97% consider this topic important or
xtremely important is still very significant.
The results encourage the debate about the relevance of the
heme. There may be speculation on the lack of dissemination
f knowledge and studies involving rural producers regarding
he relationship between governance and sustainability of rural
nterprises.
It is understood that this study has important limitations. The
ntentional nature, the type and size of the sample do not allow
CAdministração 52 (2017) 81–92 91
xtrapolations, therefore, the analysis of the hypothesis testing
hould be understood in this context. Also, the methodology of
he study was essentially exploratory and quantitative, without
 qualitative basis that could capture in depth a series of ele-
ents on the variables in question and their relationship with
he scope of research (rural producers). Favorably, it is argued
hat this study, despite these limitations, advances by proposing
 better understanding of the profile of producers, establishing
ypologies that can be deepened in future studies.
In terms of methodology, it gives the opportunity to both
ualitative studies (especially case studies), which can explore
 series of variables in depth, and quantitative studies, seeking
o understand the regularities in larger populations. Therefore,
e suggest understanding the regularities in relation to the seg-
ent of operation in the rural activity, geographic presence, size
nd complexity of the rural activity, background of the families
f producers (cultural and ethnical background), among other
xamples.
Specifically, we highlight the following for future studies: (a)
nalyzing the existence and forms of composition and perfor-
ance of boards (board of directors, advisory board) in rural
roperties; (b) examining the compensation mechanisms of the
overning boards in rural properties; (c) studying the mecha-
isms to equate the process of succession in rural properties; (d)
valuating the perspectives of the different generations involved
n the succession process in rural properties; (e) evaluating the
ain legal and corporate barriers that affect the succession pro-
ess in rural properties.
In summary, we propose a broad research agenda involving
overnance and succession in family-controlled organizations,
specially the segment of rural producers. The gap of studies in
elation to these subjects opens up opportunities for researchers
rom different areas of knowledge.
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